PANAMA ACCREDITED AND A COST EFFECTIVE SECURITY SOLUTION PROVIDER
Secure a Ship Ltd has achieved accreditation for a maritime security company to work with Panama Flagged Vessels.
UK-based Secure a Ship Ltd became one of the first maritime security companies to secure official accreditation in September 2012 from the Panama Maritime Authority sanctioning the services of armed and unarmed escort guards on vessels transiting piracy high risk areas.
Secure a Ship and ISM Shipping Solutions have been swift to act, following the recent change of law in Panama under which from 03 October 2012 all Private Maritime Security Companies (PMSCs) serving Panamanian ships must have official accreditation from the Panama Maritime Authority. Due to a lack of PMSC’s who got the accreditation Panama extended this to the 3rd January 2013.
Paul Maguire (Director) says “Getting this accreditation early shows our strength and quality within the company, we welcome other PMSC’s into this exclusive fold. This also adds to our growing list of credentials of being ISO:9001 accredited, a certified Stage 1 member of SAMI and a member of SCEG”.
The stringent review process of the Administration was effected by two of its departments and vetted by a special board of experts from the Panama Maritime Authority.
”With the new law, it is going to be easier for everyone, as all the paperwork will be with the authorities, and therefore granting approval for a team to come aboard can be achieved swiftly,. This is a positive step by Panama in its aim of ensuring flexibility and good service to ship owners and operators and ensuring that reputable companies with sound infrastructure are employed on board Panamanian registered ships.”
In MSC.1/Circ.1405/Rev.1 of 16 September 2011 the International maritime Organization raised concerns over the absence of applicable regulation and industry self-regulation, coupled with complex legal requirements governing the legitimate transport, carriage and use of firearms on ships. Further, it was said that the rapid growth in the number of private maritime security companies raised doubts about the capabilities and maturity of some of these firms.
With Panama’s new measure, any Panamanian accredited PMSC will have a flag state reference, proving to new clients and the industry that its operations and structure have been analysed by a competent administration. This promises to be an advance in aiding shipping companies to identify reliable, professional private providers of armed security.
Please see below the circular.
PANAMA MARITIME AUTHORITY MERCHANT MARINE CIRCULAR MMC243
To: Ship-owners/Operators, Company Security Officers, Private Security Companies, Legal Representatives of Panamanian Flagged Vessels, Panamanian Merchant Marine Consulates and Recognized Organizations (ROs).
Subject: Authorization for Private Maritime Security Companies (PMSC)
Reference: MMC.228 MSC.1/Circ.1405/Rev.2 MSC.1/Circ.1406/Rev.1 MSC.1/Circ.1333 MSC.1/Circ.1334 MSC.1./Circ. 1443
1. The purpose of this Merchant Marine Circular is to officially communicate that on April 4th, 2012 was published in the Official Gazette, the Resolution No.106-13-DGMM, dated March 8th, 2012, whereby the
Panama Maritime Authority establishes requirements for the Private Maritime Security Companies (PMSC) to meet, in order to become authorized by this Administration. This Resolution will enter into force on October 3rd, 2012. This has now changed to 3rd January 2013.
2. This Administration encourages all Private Maritime Security Companies (PMSC) to comply with the requirements listed on Resolution No.106-13- DGMM to be able to offer their services of Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel onboard Panamanian flagged vessels. For the English version of Res.No.106-13-DGMM, please click here. – For the Spanish version of Res.No.106-13-DGMM, please click here.
3. The Applications from the Private Maritime Security Companies (PMSC) must be submitted to the Directorate General of Merchant Marine through a Legal Representative in Panama.
4. The Panama Maritime Authority shall not issue authorizations for vessels contracting services from companies which are not duly authorized by this Administration after October 3rd. In the meantime all authorizations to carry armed personnel will be issued following the guidelines listed in our MMC 228.
PANAMA MARITIME AUTHORITY MERCHANT MARINE CIRCULAR MMC245
1. This Circular has the purpose to inform users, according to Merchant Marine Circular MMC-243, about the list of Private Maritime Security Companies (PMSC) authorized by this Administration to offer their services as Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel onboard Panamanian flagged vessels transiting High Risk Areas.
2. The Panama Maritime Authority has recognized the following companies as PMSC:
A. BRITANNIA MARITIME SECURITY LTD.
B. SECURE A SHIP LIMITED.
3. Each Private Maritime Security Company authorized should notify by formal letter or mail and also submit the required documents to the Maritime Ships Security Department of any inclusion or changes in armed personnel or inventory of weapons, according to requirements established in Resolution 106-13- DGMM ; Article Fourth, Number Fifth.
4. This Administration encourages all Private Maritime Security Companies to meet the requirements established in Resolution No. 106-13-DGMM by October 3rd, 2012 as the latest, in order to get approval for offering their services of Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel for Panamanian flagged vessels.
5. All Panamanian flagged vessels contracting Authorized Private Maritime Security Companies only need to submit Bilateral Agreement duly signed by PMSC and vessel’s representative and passport copies of Authorized Armed Security Personnel in order grant authorization from Flag State each time they need Armed Security on board.
MARITIME SECURITY PROVIDER AND PANAMA ACCREDITED
CSO’s PLEASE GET IN TOUCH FOR MORE DETAILED INFORMATION REGARDING THE PANAMA ACCREDITATION PROCESS.
BEST PRICE FOR A GREAT SERVICE
.SECURE A SHIP ARE CHEAP, COST EFFECTIVE, QUALITY DRIVEN, VALUE FOR MONEY, ONE OF THE BEST PROFESSIONAL PRIVATE MARITIME SECURITY PROVIDER. AMBREY RISK, OPS, PVI AND OTHERS ARE ALSO ACCREDITED.SECURE A SHIP ARE CHEAP, COST EFFECTIVE, QUALITY DRIVEN, VALUE FOR MONEY, ONE OF THE BEST PROFESSIONAL PRIVATE MARITIME SECURITY PROVIDER. AMBREY RISK, OPS, PVI AND OTHERS ARE ALSO ACCREDITED.SECURE A SHIP ARE CHEAP, COST EFFECTIVE, QUALITY DRIVEN, VALUE FOR MONEY, ONE OF THE BEST PROFESSIONAL PRIVATE MARITIME SECURITY PROVIDER. AMBREY RISK, OPS, PVI AND OTHERS ARE ALSO ACCREDITEDSECURE A SHIP ARE CHEAP, COST EFFECTIVE, QUALITY DRIVEN, VALUE FOR MONEY, ONE OF THE BEST PROFESSIONAL PRIVATE MARITIME SECURITY PROVIDER. AMBREY RISK, OPS, PVI AND OTHERS ARE ALSO ACCREDITEDSECURE A SHIP ARE CHEAP, COST EFFECTIVE, QUALITY DRIVEN, VALUE FOR MONEY, ONE OF THE BEST PROFESSIONAL PRIVATE MARITIME SECURITY PROVIDER. AMBREY RISK, OPS, PVI AND OTHERS ARE ALSO ACCREDITEDSECURE A SHIP ARE CHEAP, COST EFFECTIVE, QUALITY DRIVEN, VALUE FOR MONEY, ONE OF THE BEST PROFESSIONAL PRIVATE MARITIME SECURITY PROVIDER. AMBREY RISK, OPS, PVI AND OTHERS ARE ALSO ACCREDITEDSECURE A SHIP ARE CHEAP, COST EFFECTIVE, QUALITY DRIVEN, VALUE FOR MONEY, ONE OF THE BEST PROFESSIONAL PRIVATE MARITIME SECURITY PROVIDER. AMBREY RISK, OPS, PVI AND OTHERS ARE ALSO ACCREDITED.
Interim Guidelines for Owners, Operators and Masters for protection against piracy in the Gulf of Guinea region
(To be read in conjunction with BMP4)
Piracy and armed robbery (hereafter referred to as piracy) in the Gulf of Guinea region is an established criminal activity and is of increasing concern to the maritime sector. With recent attacks becoming more widespread and violent, industry has now identified an urgent need to issue these Guidelines.
Although piracy in the Gulf of Guinea region in many ways differs from that of Somalia based piracy, large sections of the Best Management Practices already developed by industry to help protect against Somalia based piracy are also valid in the Gulf of Guinea region. Consequently, these interim Guidelines aim to bridge the gap between the advice currently found in BMP4 and the prevailing situation in the Gulf of Guinea region.
Consequently, these guidelines should be read in conjunction with BMP4 and will make reference to BMP4 where relevant.
These interim Guidelines have been developed by BIMCO, ICS, INTERCARGO and INTERTANKO, and are supported by NATO Shipping Centre. A soft copy of BMP4 can be found on the websites of these organisations.
2. Area for consideration
Pirates in the Gulf of Guinea are flexible in their operations so it is difficult to predict a precise area of falling victim to piracy. As of 28 March 2012 the London Market’s Joint War Committee defines the following ‘Listed Areas for Hull War, Piracy, Terrorism and Related Perils’ for the Gulf of Guinea:
• The territorial waters of Benin and Nigeria, plus
• Nigerian Exclusive Economic Zone north of latitude 3o N, plus
￼￼￼￼• Beninese Exclusive Economic Zones north of latitude 3o N.
However, recent incidents suggest that the area is liable to change. For the purpose of this interim Guidance the area off the coasts of Nigeria, Togo or Benin can be regarded as an area in which the counter-piracy management practises should be considered.
3. Risk Assessment
For the purpose of identifying suitable measures of prevention, mitigation and recovery in case of piracy, a ship and voyage specific risk assessment as recommended in Section 3 of BMP4 should be carried out prior to entering the above described area.
Not unlike the Ship Security Assessment described in the ISPS Code, the risk assessment should include, but may not be limited to, the following:
The threat (who are the pirates, what do they want to achieve, how do they attack, how do they board, which weapons do they use etc.?)
Background factors shaping the situation (visibility, sea-state, traffic patterns e.g. other commercial ships, fishermen and human traffickers etc.)
Possibilities for co-operation with military (escorting, employment of Vessel Protection Detachments, registering with authorities etc.)
The ship’s characteristics/vulnerabilities/inherent capabilities to withstand the threat (freeboard, speed, general arrangement etc.)
Ship’s procedures (drills, watch rosters, chain of command, decision making processes etc.)
In addition to the information found in this document, supplementary information about the characteristics of the threat and regional background factors may be sought with IMB, commercial intelligence providers or local sources e.g. ship’s agents.
As also mentioned in BMP4, the risk assessment should take into consideration any statutory requirements in particular those of the flag state and/or the coastal state. Other requirements dictated by company and insurance policies should also be taken into consideration.
￼The risk assessment process:
Much of this risk assessment already exists in BMP4, since it provides an overall list of which actions to take to defend against pirate attack. However, the guidance in BMP4 must be transformed into specific actions to take and self-defence measures to apply on a ship-by-ship and voyage-by-voyage basis. For example, many pirate attacks in the Gulf of Guinea region occur whilst ships are at anchor or drifting, in which case BMP4 self-defence measures like ‘evasive manoeuvres’ are not really applicable. Thus, the risk assessment must reflect the prevailing characteristics of the specific voyage and ship, and not just be a “recycling” of advice relating to a different geographical region and a different pirate modus operandi.
4. Typical Pirate Attacks
Pirate activity within the Gulf of Guinea can be split broadly into the following categories:
• Armed Robbery – In general this is opportunistic, is becoming increasingly violent, and occurs where vessels are approaching, drifting or anchored off ports. There have been instances across the Gulf of Guinea Region e.g. off Lagos, in Port Harcourt, Bonny River, Cotonou and Lome. For the most part
the intention is to take valuables from the safe, IT equipment, and personal
• Cargo theft – This predominantly occurs in the STS transfer areas off
Cotonou, Lagos, and Lome, and is almost exclusively related to product and chemical tankers. Vessels are hijacked for several days and cargo is transferred to a smaller vessel. These incidents tend to be well-organized potentially involving a criminal element with commercial interests ashore. Recent cargo thefts have demonstrated that pirates often have a maritime know-how allowing them to disable communications, operate the cargo system etc.
• Kidnapping – generally associated with the offshore oil industry and the political instability of the Niger Delta area. There are several instances of offshore supply vessels and occasionally other ship types being attacked. Robbery is often the prime objective but occasional kidnapping of crew members can occur.
Pirate attacks in the Gulf of Guinea region often share similar characteristics to those of Somalia based pirates (see BMP 4 Section 4), but there are some key differences. For example, at this point in time, the Gulf of Guinea ‘pirate business model’ does not primarily involve kidnap for ransom therefore the crew of a ship does not in itself represent the ‘value’. Generally speaking pirates in the Gulf of Guinea are more violent than their Somalia based colleagues.
The main threat is from approaches made by high-powered speedboats, and a recent incident involved a speedboat launched from an unidentified mothership.
The risk of falling victim of a pirate attack is particularly high when the ship is at anchor or is drifting off a port e.g. close to pilot station. Another vulnerable situation is when conducting STS operations and the two ships are adrift and moored alongside each other.
For the tanker sector, cargo theft results in stolen oil products being sold in the region. For the dry cargo and other sectors, violent robbery is more common. Attacks, both outside and inside territorial waters, appear to be the result of intelligence-led planning by the pirates, with particular products such as gasoil or gasoline being targeted in very well coordinated and executed operations. Companies and ships operating regularly in the region are likely to be at increased risk of falling subject to pirate intelligence collection operations and subsequent pirate attack.
The following important advice should be noted:
Minimise use of VHF and use email or secure satellite telephone instead. Where possible only answer known or legitimate callers on the VHF, bearing in mind that imposters are likely and may even appear in uniform.
Communications with external parties should be kept to a minimum, with close attention paid to organizing rendezvous points and waiting positions. For email correspondence to Agents, Charterers, Chandlers etc. it is strongly recommended that address lists are controlled and that information within the email is concise, containing the minimum that is legally required in order to fulfil requirements or contractual obligations.
Vessels should avoid tendering the Notice of Readiness when not immediately conducting cargo operations. Contractual arrangements should be put in place with a view to keeping vessels out of harm’s way.
Know your agents and avoid or minimize requirements where possible. Unnecessary interaction with other parties creates opportunities for information regarding the vessel’s position to be compromised.
If the ship trades regularly in the region it is recommended to alter arrangements once in a while to make it harder for criminals to predict where operations might take place.
The greatest risks of piracy are at night and these need to be factored into all planning. Where possible, operations should start and end during daylight hours.
5. Ship Movement Reporting Procedures
Although this may change in future, at present there is no centralised ship movement reporting procedure in place in the Gulf of Guinea region, however, individual flag states may have their own national ship movement reporting procedures.
Any flag state reporting requirements should be clarified and complied with.
6. Company Planning
The Gulf of Guinea is not subject to an established policing mechanism by international navies, and neither the UKMTO nor MSCHOA play a role in the region.
Company planning procedures outlined in Section 6 of BMP4 should be applied in the Gulf of Guinea.
In terms of the availability of armed escort vessels, the Nigerian military are known to offer licenses to certain companies to employ government police and military personnel on board their escort vessels.
Likewise, some agents offer government police and military personnel as armed guards for deployment on board merchant ships. Such services should only be contracted if a requirement exists following the risk assessment, and only as a supplement to ship protection measures outlined in BMP4.
Using private armed guards in the Gulf of Guinea region is much more problematic than off Somalia, owing to the complex patchwork of legal, security, administrative, command and control interests that needs to be addressed and the following should be considered:
Care should be exercised when using private armed guards, as they are prevented by law from operating inside territorial waters of coastal states in the region, and authorities are known to enforce these regulations vigorously.
Local or Government forces should only be used if they are legitimate, understood and trusted.
7. Master’s Planning
Many of the Master’s planning procedures described in Section 7 of BMP4 also apply to the Gulf of Guinea, although there are no Group Transit schemes or national convoys. Given the modus operandi of the pirates operating in the Gulf of Guinea region, the Master should plan according to the following:
Rendezvous – Where possible, avoid waiting and slow steaming. Consider offering several alternative rendezvous points and advice rendezvous points at the last minute. If waiting, keep well off the coast (up to 200nm). Do not give away waiting positions.
Anchoring – Where practicable, a prolonged stay at anchorage is to be avoided.
8. Ship Protection Measures
The ship protection measures described in Section 8 of BMP4 also apply in the Gulf of Guinea. When STS operations are expected to be conducted, extra attention should be paid to the use of physical protection measures. Although barbed wire ￼￼￼￼can potentially make it very difficult to complete an STS operation, other protection measures should be considered to protect the ship from attack in these cases.
9. Vessel hardening is likely to be quite effective in this region and a moving ship also makes an effective deterrent since, unlike Somalia based pirates, ladders are not often used to board ships.
During STS operations or when adrift, equipment such as fenders, anchor chains and hawse pipes can potentially provide a vulnerable point of access for attackers, and entry should be physically blocked.
Pirates detect and target vessels by sight and by the use of AIS. Therefore limit the use of lighting at night and reduce the power or turn off AIS. Unfortunately, this has a major drawback in that it may reduce the likelihood of an intervention by ‘friendly forces’ if attacked. Consequently, AIS must be switched on immediately if the ship is boarded.
The guidelines in BMP4 Section 9 are applicable with the exception of the role described for the UKMTO and MSCHOA.
In the event of a pirate attack in the Gulf of Guinea, the best way of alerting the local authorities of an attack is via the Regional Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (RMRCC) in Lagos. This centre is run by the Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency (NIMASA) and can be contacted via details shown in Section 13 of this Guidance.
When contacted, the Lagos RMRCC will alert the military and/or coast guard forces in the region who will initiate a response if the necessary resources are available at the time of the alert.
10. If Pirates Take Control
The advice in Section 10 of BMP4 is also applicable, again with the exception that UKMTO does not play a role in the Gulf of Guinea. Instead Lagos RMRCC should be contacted.
As previously mentioned the pirates operating in the Gulf of Guinea often use violence in order to subdue the crew. Therefore it is extremely important not to engage in a fight with the pirates, because this will entail great risk of the crew getting hurt or killed. NB: Records exist of an incident where an on-board naval
guard detachment engaged in gun battle with attacking pirates leading to the killing of two navy personnel, and the kidnap for ransom of the remaining crew.
Violent shipboard robberies can take place as a result of a previously unsuccessful attack on another vessel. Therefore:
Great care needs to be taken if your ship is boarded, as life is little valued by robbers. Compliance/submission to attackers is essential once a vessel has been taken.
Generally minimizing cash carried will make vessels less attractive in the longer run.
11. In the Event of Military Action
Section 11 of BMP4 fully applies.
12. Post Incident Reporting
Section 12 of BMP4 and the related Annexes containing reporting formats also apply in the Gulf of Guinea, however with the exception of involving the UKMTO and MSCHOA in the reporting.
As described in BMP4, all piracy incidents should be reported to the IMB in accordance with Annex A to this Guidance (for contact details, see Section 13).
The relevant reporting format can be found in Annex A.
13. Contact details
Lagos Regional Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (RMRCC). The following emergency numbers are manned on a 24/7 basis:
• Mobile: +234 (0) 803 068 5167.
(Leave out the (0) when calling from outside Nigeria).
• Land line: +234 (1) 730 6618.
(Include the (1) when calling outside Lagos, and also include +234 when calling outside Nigeria).
International Maritime Bureau – IMB Piracy Reporting Centre (IMB PRC) ICC IMB (Asia Regional Office),
PO Box 12559,
Tel: + 60 3 2078 5763
Fax: + 60 3 2078 5769
E-mail: firstname.lastname@example.org / email@example.com
24 Hours Anti Piracy HELPLINE Tel: + 60 3 2031 0014
01 Name of Ship:
02 IMO No:
04 Call Sign:
05 Type of Ship:
07 Owner’s (Address & Contact Details):
08 Manager’s (Address & Contact Details):
09 Last Port/Next Port:
10 Cargo Details: (Type/Quantity)
Details of Incident
11 Date & Time of Incident:
13 Nearest Land Mark/Location:
14 Port/Town/Anchorage Area:
15 Country/Nearest Country:
PIRACY ATTACK REPORT, VESSEL
16 Status (Berth/Anchored/Steaming):
17 Own Ship’s Speed:
18 Ship’s Freeboard During Attack:
19 Weather During Attack (Rain/Fog/Mist/Clear/etc, Wind (Speed and Direction), Sea/Swell Height):
20 Types of Attack (Boarded/Attempted):
21 Consequences for Crew, Ship and Cargo:
Any Crew Injured/Killed:
22 Area of the Ship being Attacked:
23 Last Observed Movements of Pirates/Suspect Craft:
24 Type of vessel (Whaler, Dhow, Fishing Vessel, Merchant Vessel)
25 Description of vessel (Colour, Name, Distinguishing Features)
26 Course and Speed of vessel when sighted
Details of Raiding Party
27 Number of Pirates/Robbers:
28 Dress/Physical Appearance:
29 Language Spoken:
30 Weapons Used:
31 Distinctive Details:
32 Craft Used:
33 Method of Approach:
34 Duration of Attack:
36 Action Taken by Master and Crew and its effectiveness:
37 Was Incident Reported to the Coastal Authority? If so, to whom?
38 Preferred Communications with Reporting Ship:
Appropriate Coast Radio Station/HF/MF/VHF/INMARSAT
IDS (Plus Ocean Region Code)/MMSI
39 Action Taken by the Authorities:
40 Number of Crew/Nationality:
41 Please attach with this Report – A Brief Description/Full Report/Master – Crew Statement of the Attack/Photographs taken if any.
42 Details of Self Protection Measures.
Secure a Ship Ltd has achieved the internationally recognised standard ISO 9001, establishing it as one of the leaders in its field.
This independent assessment was conducted by the leading Certification Body, the British Assessment Bureau and demonstrates our commitment to customer service and quality in delivery.
Secure a Ship Ltd has now earned the right to display the coveted British Assessment Bureau ISO 9001 certification mark to demonstrate its conformance to the standard.
ISO 9001 was first introduced in 1987 and requires organisations to demonstrate that they do what they say they do and that they have a quality management system in place to ensure consistency and improvement; leading to high levels of performance and customer satisfaction. Certified organisations are committed to continuous improvement and are assessed annually to ensure progress is being maintained.
Secure a Ship Ltd has shown that it has good service reliability and process controls which means lower costs for its customers!
Paul Maguire (Director) said, “We are particularly pleased to have achieved ISO9001 certification as it underlines our commitment to our customers and our focus on quality. Not many customers get to see their suppliers’ ‘back-office’ activities. This recognition demonstrates we can provide a quality solution from quotation to delivery.”
The benefits of registration to the ISO9001 standard include:-
• Streamlining an organisation’s procedures.
• Bringing consistency to an organisation’s service delivery.
• Reducing cost and rework.
• Improving an organisation’s management practices.
• Enhanced status.
• Competitive advantage.
• Lower insurance premiums.
Secure a Ship Ltd has years of experience within the Maritime Security Industry and has grown steadily from its formation. It is now one of the most professional companies in the World and is expecting a positive result from their recent Panama accredition application which would make them the second PMSC to achieve this.
Secureaship has joined forces with our Italian partners so we can provide armed teams upon Italian Flagged Vessels.
More information can be provided by contacting our Managing Director directly at firstname.lastname@example.org
Due to the continuing high numbers of hijackings, attacks and attempted boarding in West African areas around the Gulf of Guinea, emergency contact numbers have been issued by the local authorities.
The UK Defense Attaché in Abuja has requested that the Nigerian Navy provide some emergency contact numbers which may be used by vessels, owners and operators in case of an attack or other act of piracy whilst in Nigerian waters.
The following numbers and details have been provided by the UK Foreign & Commonwealth Office:
Joint Task Force (Op PULO SHIELD) covering the Niger Delta area
+234 (0)802 363 9153
+234 (0)703 9783346
Naval Headquarters Operations Room
+234 (0)813 879 9220
Department of State Security
+234 (0)813 222 2106 +234 (0)813 222 2105
The details include numbers for mobile phones and may be subject to change.
As always, Masters are advised to take particular caution when trading in high piracy areas, and to follow good practices and procedures as laid out in BMP4.
More information regarding the piracy issue can be sought by contacting the Secure a Ship team.
An escalation of attacks from pirates off the coast of Somalia in 2007 and 2008 raised a number of alarms about the threat of piracy. According to a report from the Atlantic Council, “Since 2008, Somali pirates have attacked more than 620 vessels, hijacked over 175 private and commercial ships, and held over 3,000 people from more than forty countries hostage.” Since then, however, real progress has been achieved. As Assistant Secretary of State for Political Military Affairs Andrew Shapiro outlined in a speech at the Atlantic Council last year, “According to figures from the U.S. Navy, we are on track to experience a roughly 75 percent decline in overall pirate attacks this year compared with 2011… [and in] 2011, the number of successful pirate attacks fell by half compared to 2010.” This has been achieved through a multifaceted approach using all means of national power, including military power by expanding the use of naval assets; collaboration with the private sector by empowering industry to protect itself; legal enforcement through effective prosecution and incarceration; targeting networks with financial tracking; development and governance working to improve credible governing institutions and law enforcement in Somalia; and first and foremost through diplomatic engagement with the international community.
While piracy on the East Coast of Africa is in decline, on the West Coast it is on the rise. This is a very different phenomenon. On the West Coast it is more based on robbery and hijacking close to the shore, rather than the hostage-taking and ransom seen off the coast of Somalia.
While anti-piracy efforts have shown results, the Atlantic Council report points out that the cost of the counter-piracy is high, “The naval response alone cost the United States and its allies some $1.27 billion in 2011,” stating, “Self-protection efforts by the shipping industry may offer a sustainable and cost-effective alternative, but a set of enabling policies is urgently needed.”
These issues are important to both U.S. and African security concerns and present both models of success and opportunities for progress. However, as cooperation continues on these near term threats it is also important not to lose sight of the long-term challenges. In a recent essay for Foreign Policy, Gordon Adams warns, “through a growing security assistance program and special operations forces action, U.S. engagement in Africa is shifting from a focus on governance, health, and development to a deepening military engagement” Adding, that security-focused engagement could “backfire, harming our long-term foreign policy interests.”
As engagement with Africa on security interests deepens it is vital that broader concerns, including more capable and responsive civilian governments and economies, are not ignored and put to the side. In addition to the harm on Africa, it also raises the likelihood of increased hostility toward the United States. Adams points out there is an applicable lesson to learn from America’s experience with Latin America during the Cold War, and America’s focus on building security and anti-Communism over long-term democracy and goodwill towards the U.S., which led to a resentful population that saw America as a contributing to security states. The lesson not to ignore progress on governance and democracy should be heeded.
Source and more information found here
RING +44 (0)1295 254252 to receive a no hassle quote for our services. All our services are delivered in accordance with the International Shipping and Ports Security Code (ISPS) and the 4th edition of Best Management Practices (BMP4).
As at 3rd January 2013, Resolution No.106-13-DGMM is now in force which details the PMSC that can now work on Panama Flagged Vessels.
We at Secure a Ship welcomed the due-diligence process that was placed onto us and were in fact the first company to actively seek this out and are seen as the most renowned PMSC in this field.
Secure a Ship Ltd are Panama, ISO:9001 and a Level 1 SAMI certified PMSC using only BRITISH teams to provide you with a second to none FIRST CLASS service.
Email email@example.com or call +44 (0)1295 254252 for more information.
A merchant vessel has been attacked in position 0300N 05152E (approximately 460 miles ENE of Mogadishu) at 1130Z today. Vessels are urged to exercise extreme caution in the vicinity.